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Abstract 
 
This paper explores different ways of thinking about the group-analytic concept of 
the individual as social through and through. One explanation is based on object 
relations theory and regards the individual as social because the individual psyche is 
an ‘internal world’ of representations of social relationships. The paper argues that 
this represents a Kantian ‘both / and’ way of thinking. Another approach is based on 
Mead and this suggests that the individual is social trhough and through because 
individual mind is the same process of bodily action as the social. This represents a 
dialectical mode of thinking derived from Hegel.  
 
 
 
In his paper, Self development through subjective interaction: a fresh look at ego 
training in action, Dennis Brown (1994) builds on Foulkes’ (1948, 1964, 1971, 1973) 
views on the relationship between the individual psyche and the social by drawing on 
intersubjective perspectives in psychoanalysis (Stolorow, Brandschaft & Atwood, 
1994), Stern’s (1985, 1995) detailed studies of infant development, Merleau Ponty’s 
(1976) phenomenology and object relations theory.  Brown talks about a process of 
communication, of empathic relating, between people in a group in which there is the 
potential for personal transformation. He describes the process using Foulkesian 
notions of mirroring in which group members find themselves in each other, and 
resonance in which they emotionally attune to each other. This is a highly 
participative perspective, so well described by Merleau Ponty as ‘consummate 
reciprocity’. It is clearly a social process. Brown then draws on object relations theory 
to formulate a view of individual psyche, which emerges in the social process, as an 
‘internal world’ of representations of relationships between objects and between 
them and self objects. In other words, the individual psyche is social through and 
through because it is an ‘internal world’ of representations of social interactions. In 
this paper, I want to point to an alternative formulation drawing on George Herbert 
Mead (1934). I will then compare this way of thinking about the individual and the 
social with formulations based on object relations theory.  
 
 
Mead’s theory of gesture-response 
 
Mead argued that all social animals, including humans, communicate with each other 
through a conversation of gestures: movement, touch, sound, visual display and 
odor. Each gesture by one animal calls forth a response from another and together, 
gesture and response constitute a social act, that is, an act that is meaningful to 
those gesturing and responding. The social is a responsive process of meaningful 
signaling in continuous cycles of cooperative and competitive interaction. However, 
although there is meaning in such a process, there may be no mind or 
consciousness. Mind is present when a gesture can call forth similar responses in 
the one making it as in the one to whom it is made. The maker of a gesture can be 
aware of what the gesture means only through the capacity for calling forth in him / 
herself a similar attitude to that being called forth in the other. For example, one can 
be aware that the gesture of shouting at another may arouse fear or anger in the 
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other because the gesture of shouting arouses the potential of fear or anger in 
oneself. Such a gesture is what Mead called a significant symbol. It is significant 
because it means the same thing to the maker of the gesture and to the recipient. It 
is a symbol because it points toward a meaning. 
The elaboration of vocal gestures into language enables a more sophisticated 
development of mind as a process of action. Language enables the maker of a 
gesture to be aware, in advance, of the likely response of the recipient and it enables 
the maker of the gesture to signal to the recipient how the act is likely to evolve. The 
maker of the gesture is, thus, conscious and can think, that is, hypothesize likely 
responses to a gesture in a kind of role-play. To have a mind means to be aware of 
the possible consequences of actions, as those actions evolve, by means of silently 
conducted conversations in gesturing and responding. Mind is silent, private role-
playing of gesture-response conducted during the vocal, public interaction of 
gesture-response that is social cooperation. 
This is not a view of the autonomous individual first thinking and then 
choosing an action but of individuals in relationship continuously evoking and 
provoking responses in each other, responses that each paradoxically also selects 
and chooses through past history. The private, silent conversation of a body with 
itself is the same process as public, vocal conversation between bodies and in this 
sense mind is always a social phenomenon even though it is an individual 
conducting the private silent conversation. This theory of mind is firmly linked to the 
body because mind as a silent conversation of gestures requires a body. The 
conversation involves more than words; it is always interwoven with feelings and with 
direct communication between bodies in the medium of feelings. Furthermore, much 
of the gesture-response cycle may be unconsciously elaborated as Elias (1989) 
added.  From this perspective mind is not an ‘internal world’ of representations 
according to which a body acts. From Mead’s perspective, mind is not ‘internal’ at all 
because it is the role-playing action of a body directed toward itself, just as the social 
is the actions of bodies directed toward each other. Both individual mind and the 
social, therefore, emerge in relationships between people and both are 
conversations of gestures. The communicative interaction of gesture-response 
between people may, of course, create fantasies far removed from ‘reality’ and this 
applies equally to individual mind and to the social. Communicative interaction may 
be cooperative, caring and loving and it may, of course, be highly competitive and 
extremely destructive in both its individual mental and it its social forms. The 
communicative interaction of both individual mind and the social could flow in a fluid 
manner with a high potential for transformation or it may, of course take the repetitive 
form of habit and stereotype.   
The individual mind is then logically the same process as social relating, in 
that both are cooperative and competitive interaction. The only difference is that one 
is the action of a body silently and privately directed toward itself, while the other is 
the actions of bodies vocally and publicly directed toward each other. It is impossible 
to have a mind without the social, just as it is impossible to have the social, that is, 
sophisticated cooperative action typical of humans, in the absence of minds. Neither 
form of conversation is primary nor prior to the other. They must both arise together, 
simultaneously. This immediately renders problematic the labeling of one as more or 
less fundamental and suggests that the individual and the social are at one level of 
analysis, not two. Meaning is not something that is going on in a mind as thought 
before action but, rather, arises, and continually re-arises, in the conversation of 
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gestures, in the action and interaction, through social relationships conducted in 
significant symbols. There is no need to postulate a separate social level, or any kind 
of transpersonal processes, or any notion of a group mind.  Nor is there any need to 
postulate to something separate called a ‘mind’ in which meaning is arising.  Instead 
mind is meaning arising in the communicative interaction of a body with itself.  This 
avoids thinking about mind as an abstraction, as a place located somewhere. 
Rather, mind is a process. From this perspective, mind is not an entity located 
anywhere. Mind is the action of a body experienced in a body and it is this embodies 
characteristic that makes it impossible to say that a group has a mind. 
Mead took the argument a step further with his concept of the generalized 
other. By this he meant that one does not simply call forth in oneself the attitude to 
one’s gesture of a particular other but comes to call forth in oneself the collective 
attitude towards one’s gesture. In other words, in the private role play of silent 
conversation, the attitude of one’s group towards one’s actions finds a voice. 
Mead went further to suggest what it means to be self-conscious. One is self-
conscious when, as a subject, one becomes an object to oneself. To be an object to 
him / herself, an individual must experience him / herself from the standpoint of 
others; he or she must talk to him / herself as others talk to him or her. This happens 
as an individual learns to take up the roles of others to him / herself, as a unique 
identity, in a form of role-play with him / herself. The silent conversation then involves 
a ‘me’, which is the attitude of one’s group towards oneself. The individual’s 
response to this ‘me’, is the ‘I’, that is, the action that an individual takes in response 
to the perceived community view of him / herself. The ‘I’ response is potentially novel 
and hence unpredictable. The ‘I’ response has the potential to change others, 
opening up the way for simultaneous individual / group evolution.  Mind and self do 
not emerge out of a clash between something that is already there in the individual 
and social constraint as in the classical Freudian view. Mind and self emerge in 
social relationships. Individuals are forming and being formed by the group at the 
same time. Mind and self arise between people rather than being located in an 
individual. The notion of an ‘internal world’ then becomes unnecessary. 
 In this explanation, it is in the detailed interaction between people that their 
minds and selves arise. They arise in patterns that display both continuity and 
potential transformation. At the same time, the social, the cooperative interaction of 
humans, is also formed as continuity and transformation. The movement here is 
paradoxical in that it is both continuity and transformation at the same time, the 
known and the unknown at the same time, the individual and the social at the same 
time, all arising in the micro detail of interaction. 
 
 
An analogy from the sciences of complexity 
 
The process of interaction between people, then, is iterative interactionar that takes 
place in the medium of embodied symbols, for example, in sounds called words. 
However, as one imagines such interaction between larger and larger numbers of 
individuals, one wonders how any kind of global coherence could arise in such huge 
numbers of local interactions. This is not an issue that Mead dealt with, but it is one 
where the complexity sciences (Stacey, 2000; Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2001) offer 
important insights. 
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 Some of the work in the complexity sciences explores the properties of 
iterative processes of interaction between computer programs in the medium of 
digital symbols. It is possible that certain properties of interaction demonstrated in 
the abstract models might, therefore, offer analogies for human interaction, 
interpreted through Mead’s thought.  The modeling of complex interactions 
demonstrates the possibility that interactions between large numbers of entities, 
each entity responding to others on the basis of its own local organizing principles, 
can produce coherent patterns with the potential for novelty in certain conditions, 
namely, the paradoxical dynamics at the edge of chaos. This dynamic is one of 
coherent patterns that are stable and unstable, predictable and unpredictable at the 
same time. In other words, the very process of self-organizing interaction, when 
richly connected enough, has the inherent capacity to spontaneously produce 
coherent pattern in itself, without any blueprint or program. Furthermore, when the 
interacting entities are different enough from each other, that capacity is one of 
spontaneously producing novel patterns in itself. Abstract interactions can pattern 
themselves where those patterns have the paradoxical feature of continuity and 
novelty, identity and difference, at the same time.  This is important because it 
suggests that interaction itself is sufficient to account for coherent pattern in relating. 
There is no need to posit causal powers in some system above, beneath, behind or 
in front of that interaction. 
By analogy, the circular process of gesturing and responding between people 
who are different to one another can be thought of as having intrinsic patterning 
capacity through self-organizing relating in the medium of symbols. In other words, 
patterns of relating in local situations in the living present can produce emergent 
global pattern in the absence of any global blueprint or any system outside of the 
interaction itself. And emergent patterns can constitute both continuity and novelty, 
both identity and difference at the same time. This amounts to a particular causal 
framework, where the process is one of perpetual construction of the future as both 
continuity and potential transformation at the same time.  Individual mind and social 
relating can be thought of as patterning processes in bodily communicative 
interaction forming and being formed by themselves. 
 Culture and social structure are usually thought of as repetitive and enduring 
values, beliefs, traditions, habits, routines and procedures. From the perspective 
being put forward here, these are all social acts of a particular kind. They are 
couplings of gesture and response of a predictable, highly repetitive kind. They do 
not exist in any meaningful way in a store anywhere but, rather, they are continually 
reproduced in the interaction between people. However, even habits are rarely 
exactly the same. They may often vary as those with whom one interacts change 
and as the context of that interaction changes. In other words, there will usually be 
some spontaneous variation in the repetitive reproduction of patterns called habits.  
These habits and routines, values and beliefs are not at some higher level to the 
individual. They are part of the pattern of interaction between people. Furthermore, 
there is no requirement here of any sharing of mental contents, or any requirement 
that people should be engaging in the same private role plays. The only requirement 
for the social, understood as habits, routines and so on, is that people should be 
acting them out.  Habits here are understood not as shared mental contents but as 
history-based, repetitive actions, both private and public, reproduced in the living 
present with relatively little variation. 
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Comparing different ways of thinking about the individual and the social 
 
Stern (1985, 1995) describes mother infant interactions in minute detail. These 
interactions are, of course, bodily communications between mother and infant 
through touch, sound, gazing, smell and taste; what Mead called a ‘conversation of 
gestures’.  Stern infers that within days after birth an infant’s sense of a coherent self 
emerges in the conversation of gestures.  From Mead’s perspective, mother and 
infant are forming the social, that is their conversation of gestures, while at the same 
time they are being formed by that conversation, for it is not simply the infant self that 
is emerging because the mother too changes in the process.  This is a rather 
different interpretation of Stern’s observations to that made from an object relations 
perspective. 
Brown (1994) says that the infant self emerges from a barely differentiated 
unity with the mother as the infant comes to experience objects as part of the self. 
These objects influence perceptions of what is inside the infant and outside, so that 
inside and outside mutually recreate each other.  Later, relationships with others are 
internalised as representations of self in relation to others, forming an ‘internal world’. 
This internal world consists of representations of objects and relationships between 
them, all interacting with each other and the self, so becoming organised together 
with the ego and the superego. The ego mediates and adapts the mind to the 
outside world. Some say it might be though of as rules for relating to objects. It scans 
the field, differentiates and synthesises experience. What is being postulated here is 
a ‘system’ storing representations, which lies behind interaction exercising causal 
powers over it. In the course of this internalising, the relationships internalised are 
said to be impregnated by values, customs, history and so on. In other words they 
are impregnated by the social and this is how the social is transmitted from one 
generation to the next. What is being postulated here is a ‘system’ of shred values 
and customs, which exists outside interaction itself and exercises causal powers 
over it. 
Leader (2000) describes the origins of thinking about the mind as an internal 
world in seventeenth century debates about the distinction between inner and outer.  
At that time the camera was used as the metaphor for vision. Images, or 
representations were said to from on the retina just as they formed on the inner 
surface of the camera. The eye was then taken as a metaphor for the mind and the 
mind’s eye was said to form representations rather like the eye, rather like the 
camera. Those critical of this move in the seventeenth century agued that it 
introduced a misleading topography of internal and external and a third term 
between the thinker / actor and the object. This moves the focus of attention away 
from thinking, and other aspects of mind, as action. 
Modern cognitive science is built squarely on this notion of mind / brain 
representing an external reality, added to which is the metaphor of the computer 
used to think of the mind / brain as an information processor. This leads to cognitive 
science’s version of the internal world, taking the form of mental models, much of 
which are below the level of awareness. The seventeenth century debate about this 
approach has re-surfaced in the constructivist challenge to cognitivist science by 
Maturana and Varela (1992) and by neuroscientists Kelso (1995), Freeman (1995) 
and others who argue that the brain does not represent reality in any simple sense, 
nor does it store and retrieve memories in any simple sense. In various ways they 
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stress the way in which the body / brain, enacts, selects and so creates the world 
into which one acts. Object relations theory differs from a cognitivist perspective in 
that its ‘representations’ are not simply accurate reflections of reality but are 
elaborated by unconscious phantasy and by their own internal interactions.  This 
‘internal world’ also enacts or selects behaviour on the basis of past object relations. 
However, there is still the problem of just how this ‘internal world’ of representations 
can be reconciled with a more complex view of brain functioning. Furthermore, in 
both cognitivist and object relations perspectives, a third realm, a hidden order or 
process, is introduced outside the bodily action of relating or communicating. It is this 
idea of a ‘third’ that I want to focus on. 
 When we say that the relationships internalised as representations in 
the ‘internal world’ are impregnated by the social, that the individual is permeated by 
the social, we are positing a system external to the interaction, which we call the 
‘social’. In other words, we are ascribing agency to this social system, ‘as if’ it had 
purpose or a kind of intention.  Then when we talk about an ‘internal world’, we are 
positing another system in which agency is also located in, say, the mediating ego. It 
is also ‘as if’ this has purpose, or a kind of intention. What we do is then determined 
by the action of both the social and the ‘internal world’. This is the kind of ‘both / and’ 
appraoch to be found in Foulkes’ figure-ground thinking. Foulkes stated that the 
inside (individual) and outside (social) world cannot be separated except by artificial 
isolation so that both are ‘abstractions’ in thought. Foulkes suggested that we need 
to think about this matter in figure-ground terms. Sometimes one focuses attention 
on the individual as figure against the ground of the group, and at other times, one 
focuses on the group as the figure against the ground of individuals. This is clearly a 
‘both / and’ way of thinking: sometimes one thinks in one way, and sometimes one 
thinks in the other way, according to one’s purpose.  
 This kind of thinking is very much reflected descriptions of the group matrix as 
a multi-personal field in which subjects and objects appear, interact, change and 
transform in personal, interpersonal and transpersonal functions. The matrix is the 
common ground which ultimately determines the meaning upon which all 
communications rest. Brown links this with Merleau Ponty’s treatment: 
 
.. my thoughts and his are interwoven into a single fabric, … in which 
my words and his are called forth by the state of the discussion and are 
inserted into the shared opinion which neither of us creates. (1976, 
p354) 
 
The matrix is also thought of in terms of levels: the primordial, the foundation, the 
projective and the dynamic (Foulkes, 1964). 
 In talking in this way we are postulating a system that is behind, above, 
across, beneath the action of communicating and relating. This system is described 
as field, common ground, single fabric, state of discussion, shared opinion and it 
determines the meaning on which communication rests. In other words, we are 
postulating a system outside of interaction itself that has agency, causal powers, 
some kind of purpose or intention.  We are clearly doing this when we casually say, 
‘it is in the matrix’.  So, when we interact with each other in a group, the agency or 
cause lies outside, behind, across the interaction in both the agency of the ‘inner 
worlds’ of each, including the internalised shared social (foundation matrix), and in 
the dynamic matrix, or ground, that we together form. This agency of the matrix is 
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sometimes referred to as a ‘group mind’ or as transpersonal processes. Ultimately, 
however, it seems that human freedom and the possibility of novelty and 
transformation lie in the capacity of the individual to become aware through the 
group process and choose to change. 
 I want to suggest that it is worth reflecting on this kind of ‘both / and’ thinking 
and how it differs from the kind of thinking Mead proposed.  ‘Both / and’ thinking is 
very widespread and it has come to feel quite natural. For example, we do not think it 
odd to ascribe intention, or agency to an organisation. We say that Nike exploits the 
poor in less developed countries and we say that the government has caused the 
fuel crisis. Where does this kind of thinking come from? To answer the question we 
have to go back to Immanuel Kant. 
 
 
Kant’s thought 
 
In Kant’s time the natural scientific method was emerging. This method is one by 
which humans come to know reality through careful observation, formulating 
hypotheses about cause and effect links having an ‘if-then’ structure applied to one 
part of a whole, and then testing those hypotheses empirically. Parts are thus 
postulated to behave predictably according to efficient causality, while the interaction 
between them is accorded no significance. The claim is that nature is entirely 
determined by necessary laws of the ‘if-then’ kind, yielding continuity and repetition 
without the possibility of novelty. 
Kant (1790) recognised the importance of this emerging scientific method but 
was concerned with the way in which it conflicted with the notion of human freedom. 
Humans are part of nature and so subject to natural laws but they are autonomous 
and so can choose goals. Kant saw this conflict as an ‘antinomy’, that is, mutually 
contradicting statements that defied human understanding.  He formulated this as 
thesis and antithesis and solved the antinomy by arguing for a "both…and" position, 
or synthesis. 
First, he made a distinction between a mechanism and an organism in nature. 
A mechanism is defined as a functional unity in which the parts of the mechanism 
exist for one another in the performance of a function. They receive their function as 
parts from the functioning of the whole. A finished notion of the whole is, therefore, 
required before the parts can have any function and the parts must be designed and 
assembled to play their particular role, without which there cannot be the whole. 
Mechanisms were subject to linear cause and effect links, that is, the efficient 
causality of the scientific method.  An organism, however, is both a functional and a 
structural unity in that the parts not only exist for each other but by means of each 
other. The parts of a living organism are not first designed and then assembled into 
the unity of the organism. Rather, they arise as the result of interactions within the 
developing organism. The parts do not come before the whole but emerge in the 
interaction of spontaneously generated differences that give rise to the parts within a 
unity, in a dynamic of stable repetition. Here, organisms develop from simple initial 
forms, such as a fertilized egg, into a mature adult form, all as part of an inner 
coherence expressed in the dynamic unity of the parts. 
Kant described this as ‘purposive’, that is, displaying a unified form in itself. 
An organism is not goal-oriented in the sense of having a movement towards an 
external result, but rather, moves to a mature form, which is unique in a particular 
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context. Kant proposes that organisms were to be understood in a systemic way in 
which causality was predominantly formative in that it was in the self-organizing 
interaction of the parts that those parts and the whole emerged. In this way, Kant 
introduced, for the first time, a systems theory. Furthermore, he argued that nature 
could be understood as moving toward a purpose or final cause, not as an objective 
explanation, but rather as a regulative idea or principle. This regulative idea provides 
an explanation "for us". In doing this, Kant established a functional perspective on 
nature as systems in which the formative process of the systems was the dominant 
form of causality, to which was subordinated an ‘as if’ purpose (teleology), namely, to 
realise a mature form of itself. 
Secondly, however, Kant held that this systems notion of causality, with its ‘as 
if’ purpose, could never apply to humans because, although part of nature, humans 
exercise a causality based on freedom. Human action had to be understood in terms 
of autonomously chosen goals and autonomously chosen actions to realize them. 
This was the first time that the “both…and” way of thinking was used  Kant laid the 
basis for a way of thinking which eliminates paradox and avoids settling for one or 
the other extreme in that humans are both subject to the laws of nature as system 
with ‘as if’ purpose and free of them to set their own goals.  Kant argued that we are 
truly human in setting on-going goals for our actions but we can also approach 
nature using an understanding of this causality of on-going goal setting.  When we 
do so, however, we do it in a kind of “as if” way of thinking.  Nature is understood as 
an unfolding form that has a goal of its own, that is, as a system.  However, it is not 
the dynamic of nature but the observing scientist who hypothesizes the ‘as if’ goal. 
Although Kant held that this way of thinking should not be applied to human 
activity, we have come to do so in a widespread way. For example, physicians often 
talk a about the body sensing a need, or repairing damaged tissue, ‘as if’ the body 
were exercising intention or agency. We speak of a nation, an organization, or a 
group as acting with intention. We talk about culture, or overriding values, as if they 
were outside human interaction and we ascribe an intention or agency to them. This 
removes the explanation from immediate experience.  This is what we are doing 
when we talk about ‘the social permeating an individual’ or when we talk about the 
‘internal world’ of an individual. What we are doing is locating intention or agency in a 
system that is behind or above the phenomenology of the interaction between 
people. 
Mead, however, avoids this appeal to a ‘system’ behind, beneath or above 
interaction and stays with the phenomenon of interaction itself. In doing this he 
follows Hegel rather than Kant. 
  
 
Dialectical movement of thought 
 
Hegel (1807) challenged Kant's paradigm of a "both…and" resolution to paradox and 
proposed a unified theory that dealt with paradox as the dialectical movement of 
thought. Dialectical can mean the testing of truth by logical disputation when, for 
example, one talks about the dialectic between systems theory and psychoanalysis. 
This is not what Hegel’s dialectic means. Another interpretation of dialectic is 
expressed in the Kantian language of thesis and antithesis, where the interaction of 
these polar opposites yields a new synthesis, which still contains both thesis and 
antithesis and they continued to interact to yield yet another synthesis. This has 
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become the most widespread interpretation of dialectic, to found, for example in 
Marxist thinking.  In this interpretation, forms unfold in a continuing movement in 
which each form brings forth its opposite and it is the interaction between these 
opposites that produces the self-organising movement of emergent states, which are 
not truly novel but, rather, rearrangements of what was already there. The time 
structure here is linear movement from the present of thesis-antithesis to the future 
of synthesis. 
 In Hegel’s thought, however, Kant's resolution of paradox in a "both…and" 
paradigm is replaced by a paradigm of living experience as the paradox of 
movement. Hegel understood thought solely from within the process of thinking, 
drawing attention to continuously evolving identity and change. In this movement of 
identity, there is both the possibility of sameness, or continuity, and the potential for 
spontaneous transformation at the same time. This movement is the dialectic and it 
is paradoxical in that it is both the repetition and the transformation of identity at the 
same time. It is in this movement of repetition and change at the same time, that the 
future is being perpetually constructed. 
 Mead took this kind of perspective in talking about communication between 
organisms as social acts consisting of a gestures made by one organism and the 
responses to that gesture by others. Here meaning arises solely within the social 
interaction. There is no need to posit an ‘internal world’ behind action or a ‘social 
system’ above interaction. All emerges in interaction.  
In conversation, we follow the same iterative movement in which one 
discovers the meaning of what one is saying in the response of others to it. We find 
ourselves recognizing the meaning of what we are saying as we speak into the 
response of others and as we do this, the meaning of what we are saying may well 
be transforming. This is a process in which the movement is not from here (your 
word) to there (the other’s understanding of it) but a circular movement that 
transforms where you have moved from (your word) and where you are moving to. 
Each statement takes meaning from the subsequent response and even changes in 
meaning in the light of even later responses. This paradoxical, dialectic process has 
a known-unknown quality in which there is the transformative possibility of the 
genuinely new as well as the possibility of simple repetition of the past. 
Communication is a movement from and towards an as yet unrecognised position 
that comes to be recognised (known) in the act of communication itself. That 
recognition may sustain or shift the communicants’ identities. The experience of 
meaning is occurring in the present. However, this is not a dismissal of history 
because each present is a repetition of the past but with the potential for 
transformation. The source of change lies in the detail of interactive movement in the 
living present.   
   
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
If one takes the perspective of object relations theory, the individual is social through 
and through because the social, as a system outside of interaction itself and at a 
higher level than the individual, impregnates the ‘internal world’ of the individual, a 
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system behind the interaction with others.  From the kind of dialectical perspective of 
Mead, the individual is social through and through because the individual psyche is 
the same process as the social. Both are communicative action, the psyche being 
the communicative interaction of a body with itself and the social being the 
communicative interaction of a body with other bodies. The one is private and silent 
while the other is public and vocal but both are the same process. Instead of locating 
‘the unconscious’ in an ‘internal world’ unconscious processes are essentially 
aspects of communicative interaction in both its private silent and public vocal forms.  
When Brown quotes Gordon, one can hear what I think Mead is talking about: 
 
In the intersubjective realm there is no inner and outer, only a body of 
context and experience which expresses itself in a “consummate 
reciprocity” in which we discern ourselves through the other. (Gordon, 
1991, p43) 
 
 
It may be useful to explore how we can move away from ‘both / and’ ways of thinking 
in terms of both ‘internal worlds’ and the ‘social’, because that way of thinking 
distances us from direct experience in the living present by postulating some 
causative system behind, above, beneath or across interaction and relationships. We 
might explore how we can stay with the phenomenology of direct interaction, holding 
the kind of paradox in which individuals form while being formed by the social at the 
same time. Individual minds and the social are then the same processes of 
communicative interaction, in which the social is not outside the interaction, nor are 
unconscious processes. The only relevant culture, values, beliefs, and so on, are 
those in the process of reproduction and transformation in a local situation in the 
living present. The social is then not some impersonal force with a kind of intention 
or causal power of its own, but a process of communicative interaction in which the 
person (the individual, mind, psyche) emerges as continuity and potential 
transformation, as does the group. 
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